North Korea may stage a military provocation against the South if Seoul's conservative government does not comply with its demands.

1. North Korea’s and Pakistan’s human rights records are abysmal, but Pakistan is a strategic partner and North Korea is a pariah.

2. International law is important, yet the United States can sign a deal with India, undermining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

I like the observation by Jeff Procak’s from Jersey City, N.J., though, the most.

Your proposal to conduct a hypocrisy audit is all well and good, but misses the point. Double standards are merely symptomatic of the fact that the United States has no coherent foreign policy to begin with. Since the end of the Ronald Reagan presidency, the United States has bumbled its way from one ad hoc response to the next, making things up as we go along.

What double standards would you add to the next president’s audit?

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©2008 PoliGazette . All Rights Reserved.

Although it’s horrible what the communists of North Korea do to their fellow countrymen, the reality of the matter is that the primary concern of the West is its own security, and the balance of power and stability of the region. It’s horrible that North Korea has concentration camps, but the reality of the situation is that there isn’t much we do about that without destabilizing the entire country and, thus, the region as a whole. As such, trying to force the North to destroy its concentration camps immediately isn’t doable.

This means that we have to do what is in our own direct interest. This is not convincing North Korea to close its concentration camps but to close its nuclear facilities and to destroy them. This is what the West’s goal should be right now; once that’s over and done with, we can talk about concentration camps and the North’s attempt to starve its own people to death (starving citizens don’t have the energy to revolt).

Having determined the closure of such facilities to be our primary goal, we have to come up with a way to do so. The hard approach has been tried. It worked, but the stick only works when you also promise a carrot. So we promised the North a carrot; if you close down your nuclear facilities, you’ll be taken off the terrorism blacklist. They closed it down and what did we do?

Nothing.

North Korea then reopened its nuclear facilities, in a move that made perfect sense to itself and to virtually every outside with some knowledge about the country and region. The stick had been tried, the carrot shown, but not given. Since people aren’t horses, you actually have to give them a piece of the carrot when they do something good as a reward, and then promise more when they do something else you want them to do.

In this case that means that you give them a piece of the carrot (take them off the terrorism blacklist), make sure the nuclear facilities remain closed and then continue to talk about destroying said facilities. Once that’s done you focus on other issues such as concentration camps.

That’s the only logical approach to the North Korean problem. Applebaum may not like it, but ‘wrong’ and ‘right’ don’t have a lot to do with the policy towards this renegade country. Security, however, does.

©2008 PoliGazette . All Rights Reserved.

As noted in our report yesterday, one of the main reasons North Korea reopened its nuclear facility was because its leaders were disappointed that they were not taken off the infamous blacklist. 

Map of North Korea

All the United States would have to do to make North Korea comply once again was to remove the country ruled by communists from the list.

The stick is often used these days in order to force hostile regimes to comply with rules established by the United Nations and other international bodies. The stick is, of course, important, but without the carrot, one will always fail in the long run. In the end, individuals and countries do not merely react to the stick, you also need to promise and give them something in return for good behavior. North Korea’s reaction today should serve as a reminder of this golden rule.

©2008 PoliGazette. All Rights Reserved.

©2008 PoliGazette. All Rights Reserved.

The Soviet Union was once a mighty empire, controlling large chunks of land in Europe and Asia, and giving the West a mighty enemy. Then it all fell apart; the individual states (many of them incorporated by force) wanted their freedom, and Boris Yeltsin wanted his own Russia to rule, and so the Soviet empire ended. Then began the decline. Then rose a strongman out of all this, one who had the blood of the all-powerful intelligence agency KGB running through him. On his own he could not do anything; however, he was lucky. Russia had large tracts of oil and gas, and had turned into a large exporter of these, bringing in revenue, and helping regrow the power.

However, in the midst of all this, the world did not stay still. Many of the former Soviet republics did not stay still, moving towards the West (and seemingly away from the clutches of their former all-powerful dictatorial landlord), striking closer relationships with them. At the same time, like any major power (and one that remembers all too well how powerful it is), Russia grew increasingly resentful of this emergence of the West in an area that it treats as its backyard (a close equivalent would be if Mexico suddenly became more hostile to the US and very very friendly towards Russia or China).

This may well seem normal for a powerful country to treat its immediate neighbors as its areas of influence, but not so for the country so dominated. Ask Finland, that has fought wars with Russia in the past over this dominance, and ask Afghanistan that does not like being called as an area of Pakistani influence, as if it has no identity of its own.

So, when Ukraine tried to show itself as more hostile towards Russia, there was a sudden crippling blockade of the oil and gas it gets from Russia; and now Georgia. Ever since President Mikheil Saakashvili came to office and had a campaign of getting back the pro-Russian provinces of South Ossetia and a second separatist area, Abkhazia, Russia has been seething. It already knows that it is much more powerful. The US wants its support in the initiatives against Iran and North Korea, and cannot afford to antagonize Russia. And the Georgian leader gave Vladimir Putin just that chance. He tried to take one of the provinces, South Ossetia back, and met such overwhelming Russian force (without any check by any other party) that Western leaders were worried that Putin may be trying to gain more geographic control inside Georgia.

Right now, things are moving towards a cease-fire, but Russia must have intended this as a show of force to Georgia and others, that they are truly helpless when faced with this great bear.

Presidential candidate Barak Obama immediately countered, and reasserted his position that a refusal to talk to one’s enemies is not a sign of strength, but is rather a sign of weakness, and that a policy of robust negotiation, even with our enemies, would be part and parcel of an Obama administration.

Who is right on this score? Should we be willing to talk to our enemies, as Obama suggests, or should we shun them, as the current administration contends?

Both points of view have some measure of validity. President Bush could say that we sacrifice some of our prestige, as the most powerful nation on earth, when we talk to our enemies. It is as if the President lowers his stature when he talks to leaders like Iran’s Ahmadinejad. And what could be accomplished with such talk? Do we have any chance of changing Ahmadinejad’s mind? Obviously, his actions speak louder than words. He does not even hint at being open to suggestion. And conceivably, even in the face of the most persuasive arguments, he is not likely to budge from his extremist views. So what’s the point?

A lot of the reluctance to talk to one another has to do with pride, both personal and national pride. You don’t become President of the United States without having a certain amount of pride in your country, and without being able to inspire a sense of pride in the hearts of your fellow Americans. And so, when you accuse Ahmadinejad of being complicit in the killing of American soldiers, or of sponsoring terror, or of pursuing nuclear weapons for the sake of consolidating control of the region, it becomes almost impossible to swallow your pride, and to sit down and talk.

But the fact is that not talking is a way of saying something as well. If we refuse to talk to Ahmadinejad, we’re saying that his policies are so off the wall, that we cannot even imagine brokering a deal, and that we don’t want to waste our time even trying. And Ahmadinejad, whose only claim to fame is his ability to arouse passions in his people, can use our refusal to talk as confirmation to his people that there is no alternative to resistance, and that Iran has no choice but to protect herself from the arrogance of the West, as exhibited by a failure to talk. As such, our refusal to talk plays right into Ahmadinejad’s hands.

So who is right? Once approach may be to sit down and talk to leaders like Ahmadinejad, and to talk tough to him, but not for the purpose of convincing him, but rather for the public consumption of the people of Iran, and of the world at large. So, for example, you could say to Ahmadinejad, and the leadership he represents, something along these lines: “Look, with all due respect, we’re not about to let you acquire nuclear weapons, and we’re prepared to go to the mat on this; but we are also prepared to offer you a deal that gives you the energy you need, and that compensates your nation for giving up its nuclear aspirations.”

If you say something along these lines, you’re still making your point, you’re still able to hold your head up high, but you’re also driving home the point that you’re open to making a deal, and that such a deal will allow Iran’s leaders to save face. Saving face in the Middle East can be the difference between success and failure in negotiating our differences away. And truth be told, even the bush administration has proven that negotiation, and allowing you adversary to safe face, are possible even with the most intransigent and irrational of enemies.

It is difficult to imagine a more off the wall leader than Kim Jong-Il of North Korea. He was much closer to having a nuclear weapons stockpile than Iran. And his country was much more isolated than Iran. The U.S. did not refuse to negotiate. The U.S., instead, negotiated within the framework of the six party talks, thus utilizing the common interest of other countries in the region, particularly China, to exert even more pressure on North Korea, than could have been exerted by any one nation. If proved successful, at least for the time being, and U.S. food shipments are on their way to North Korea even as we speak. Success in North Korea contrasts sharply with stalemate in Iran.

Each adversary has to be handled differently, in relation to the circumstances at hand. On balance, however, if handled properly, it could well be argues that Obama is right to suggest that robust and direct negotiation is preferable to a failure to talk to one another. Such negotiation could convince a leader like Ahmadinejad that he can save face by cutting a deal, and thereby strengthen his position, and that such an outcome is preferable to military intervention.

If Ahmadinejad is not moved, than at least the willingness to talk, and to place a reasonable offer on the table, may convince Iran’s citizenry that it is in their best interest to pressure their government into a deal. And if such negotiation, as in the case of North Korea, could be undertaken within the framework of a consortium of nations with vital interest in the outcome, then so much the more reason why the outcome will likely be a positive one. And if we fail to solve the matter peacefully, we can at least take comfort in knowing that we did everything we could in that regard, which in and of itself is at least worth something too.

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Joshua Landis rounds up media reactions on the footage, and comments on America's “Shoot-first-and-ask-questions-later” policy.

The second criticism of the CIA's effort was to argue that Washington should not be encouraging Israel to launch bombing raids without first going through legal channels, international agencies, and peaceful alternatives. Shoot-first-and-ask-questions-later policies are sure to undermine US legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. They will do nothing to dispel Arab anger at US and Israeli arrogance. On the contrary, the propensity to use force as a first option will convince others to do the same.

Sasa from The Syria News Wire, tries to put the accusations in their international context, and wonders why did they wait this long to release such “important” information.

There's nothing new here. These accusations were leveled when Israel destroyed a building in Syria with an air raid last September. Now the US has produced photographic ‘evidence' and given it to the UN nuclear agency. But they're not happy - the IAEA is furious at the delay in handing these photos over.
So why the delay? Look at the timing. It comes on the day America is about to finish negotiating with North Korea. And it comes two days after Israel revealed it was willing to return the whole Occupied Golan Heights in return for a peace treaty with Syria.

And finally, we stop at Ihsan's, where he also seems highly skeptical of any concrete facts behind the allegations, but raises another issue: Whatever is the purpose of that building, we seem to have a case of high treason. “Have some heads rolled in Damascus over this or not?” he asks.

The photos were not just taken from a satellite; in fact, the most compelling photos were taking from within, outside, and few meters away from the building and during different phases of its construction. Whoever took them was available on site and did not just sneak some peaks from afar. The alleged extreme secrecy surrounding the “project” would naturally suggest extreme security measures and “no cameras allowed” signs all over the place. Yet, the person(s) took the shots was pretty comfortable judging from the angles of the photos. This means one of two things, it has never been a top secret covert location as claimed and anyone could get there, or the presence of a huge fat rat among or a friend of the elite and most trusty people who were in charge of it. I, however, lean toward the latter.